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EMPIRICAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF COMPARABLE WORTH 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg 
ALTHOUGH some efforts to implement comparable worth have taken place in the private sector, the major push has occurred 
in state and local governments, a sector of the economy in which 
union membership is growing and a large proportion of the employ-
ees are women. Starting with a 1974 state of Washington study, sev-
eral states have undertaken formal job evaluation studies to see how 
their compensation systems mesh with the principle of comparable 
worth, and several state and local governments have begun to imple-
ment comparable worth either through the legislative or collective bar-
gaining process (see Ehrenberg and Smith 1987a, tables 10.1 and 
10.2). 
Although proponents and opponents of comparable worth continue 
to debate the legitimacy of the concept, to some extent events have 
passed them by. Protestations of economists to the contrary, the con-
cept of comparable worth has become widely accepted in the public 
sector of some states, raising the policy question of whether the con-
cept should be extended to other public employees in the state and 
local sectors and to the federal and private sectors. While debate on 
this issue will undoubtedly continue to be both emotionally charged 
and politically motivated, rational decision making must include an 
I am grateful to the authors of papers that were still in preliminary form, including 
several that were presented at a September 1987 National Academy of Science Authors' 
Workshop Panel on Pay Equity, for permitting me to read and cite their works. Revised 
versions of the NAS papers will appear in Michael and Hartmann (forthcoming). 
Without implicating them for what remains, I am grateful to Francine Blau, Pamela 
Cain, Janice Madden, John Pencavel, Robert Smith, Elaine Sorensen, and two anony-
mous referees for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
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evaluation of what the empirical consequences of comparable worth 
are likely to be. Decision makers in both the legislative and collective 
bargaining processes need to know, for example, whether implemen-
tation of comparable worth can be expected to improve the female-
male earnings ratios significantly, whether it would lead to a decline 
in the employment of women, whether it would induce more women 
to enter the labor force, whether it would help or hinder the occupa-
tional mobility of women and reduce occupational segmentation, and 
who would "win" and who would "lose." 
To help focus subsequent debate, this paper presents a nontechni-
cal survey of the small but growing empirical literature by economists 
on the consequences of comparable worth. I discuss in turn studies of 
the consequences of comparable worth on the male-female earnings 
gap, of its potential to affect adversely the employment of women, of 
its effects on the labor supply and occupational mobility of women, 
and of its effects on women and their families as a group. The survey 
is critical in nature and points to areas in which research is needed. 
There are several important empirical issues relevant to future pol-
icy debate that I do not discuss. These include the existence of sex 
bias in describing or evaluating jobs, the difficulty (some would argue 
impossibility) of devising a single evaluation scheme that can mean-
ingfully compare the "worth" of all employees in a single firm, and 
the problem of rater reliability; these are all issues that have been, and 
will be, addressed by noneconomists. I also do not discuss a key the-
oretical issue of concern to economists, namely, whether it makes any 
sense to speak of the worth of a job independent of labor market 
conditions. Rather, my focus is solely on empirical studies of the con-
sequences of implementing a comparable worth policy. 
Effect on Earnings Gap 
Estimates of whether implementing comparable worth would have a 
significant effect on the gap between the average earnings of females 
and the average earnings of males have been both ex ante and ex 
post in nature. Ex ante studies (Ehrenberg and Smith 1987a; So-
rensen 1986, 1987a, 1987b; Johnson and Solon 1986; Aldrich and 
Buchele 1986; and Smith 1988) use cross-section data to estimate 
how much women's wages would increase if comparable worth were 
implemented in a way the authors specify. Ex post studies (Kahn 
1987; Killingsworth 1987a, 1987b; and Orazem and Matilla 1987) try 
to infer what has happened to the earnings of males and females 
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after the actual implementation of comparable worth-type pay adjust-
ments in the public sector. I discuss each type of study in turn. 
Ex Ante Studies. Most, but not all, states have conducted job evalu-
ations for their employees based on the factor point method 
(Treiman 1979). The characteristics of jobs are described, and raters 
then assign point scores to each job on a number of dimensions. In 
the widely used Hay point system, for example, developed by Hay 
Associates, these dimensions are know-how, problem solving, account-
ability, and working conditions. In another widely used system, devel-
oped by Norman D. Willis and Associates, the dimensions are 
knowledge and skill, mental demand, accountability, and working con-
ditions. The points a job receives for each category are then summed 
to get a total score, or measure of worth for the job. 
Assuming that the principle of comparable worth requires that jobs 
of equal worth be paid equal wages, one can compute a comparable 
worth wage gap (CWWG), or estimate of how much, on average, 
wage levels in female-dominated jobs (typically taken to be those that 
employ at least 70 percent females) would have to be increased to 
achieve equal wage levels with equally rated male-dominated jobs 
(taken to be those that employ at least 70 percent males): First, esti-
mate a wage equation in which a measure of the occupational wage 
(e.g., the starting wage scale, the mid-range wage scale, or the maxi-
mum wage scale in the occupation) in male-dominated jobs is speci-
fied to be a function of only the occupation's total factor point score. 
Next, compute, in percentage terms, how much the actual wage in 
each female-dominated job lies below this estimated male wage equa-
tion; this is an estimate of the magnitude of the comparable worth 
wage adjustment required in each occupation. Finally, weight each of 
these individual occupational wage adjustments by the share of em-
ployees in each occupation and then aggregate across the female-
dominated occupations to come up with the CWWG. 
This was the approach followed by Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Rob-
ert S. Smith (1987a) and Elaine Sorensen (1987a), who together 
studied pay systems for state government employees in five states and 
local government employees in one municipality prior to any imple-
mentation of comparable worth in the jurisdictions. Of course, in im-
plementing the methodology described above, the researchers had to 
decide which wage measures to use (Sorensen used a single measure; 
Ehrenberg and Smith experimented with starting, mid-range, and 
maximum salaries), which functional form to use to describe the 
wages of males (Sorensen used a linear equation, Ehrenberg and 
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Table 5.1. Estimates of Comparable Worth Wage Gaps (CWWG) for State 
Employees in Selected States and Municipal Employees in San Josea 
Study 
Ehrenberg & Smith 
(1986) 
Sorensen (1987a) 
Jurisdiction 
Minnesota (1981) 
Washington (1974) 
Connecticut (1980) 
Iowa (1983) 
Michigan (early 1980s) 
Minnesota (1981) 
San Jose (1982) 
Washington (1983) 
Evaluation 
System 
Hay 
Willis 
Willis 
Arthur Young 
Arthur Young 
Hay 
Hay 
Willis 
Estimated 
CWWG 
14.6-20.0% 
21.9-23.9 
15.4-20.2 
15.9 
17.5 
21.4 
25.5 
33.5 
aThe larger estimate observed by Sorensen for the state of Washington than those ob-
tained by Ehrenberg and Smith may reflect the latter's use of data from different years 
(1983 versus 1974). 
Smith experimented with linear and loglinear functional forms), and 
whether to enter the four individual factor point scores rather than 
the total score as predictors in the male wage equation (Ehrenberg 
and Smith experimented with the four-factor point scores because 
this allowed the existing male-dominated occupational structure to 
determine the marginal value the state placed on an additional point 
in each of the four categories, rather than assuming that only total 
factor points affected wages). 
The results of the two studies are summarized in table 5.1. 
CWWGs in the range of 15.4 to 33.5 percent were found for the 
six jurisdictions. The range of estimates for each state in the Ehren-
berg and Smith study occurred because of all the experimentation 
they did. In each case, however, their estimates were fairly robust 
to the methods used. 
Given these estimates, one can compute the effect of making such 
comparable worth wage adjustments on the relative earnings of 
men and women by computing hypothetical wages for all female and 
male employees after such adjustments (assuming these adjustments 
are made only in female-dominated occupations and are given to em-
ployees of both sexes employed in these occupations) and then con-
trasting the ratio of average female to average male wages after the 
adjustments to the ones that existed before. This was the procedure 
followed by Sorensen: the unweighted average (across the six jurisdic-
tions) earnings ratio observed before the hypothetical adjustments 
was 76 percent, whereas it was 87 percent after the adjustment. Sor-
ensen thus concluded that, on average, such comparable worth wage 
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adjustments would reduce the female-male earnings gap for govern-
ment employees in these jurisdictions by about 45 percent (11/24). 
For several reasons, one must be cautious in drawing conclusions 
from these numbers about the likely effects of implementing compa-
rable worth for state employees. First, in some of the states (e.g., 
Washington), the job evaluations covered only a sample of state em-
ployee occupations; the results may not generalize to other state em-
ployee groups. Second, such wage adjustments raise total labor costs 
(on average Sorensen computes this increase to be 8 percent of pay-
roll), which, along with the changing relative costs across occupations, 
may cause the level and composition of employment across both 
male-dominated and female-dominated occupations to change. So-
rensen implicitly assumes no such changes would occur. Finally, given 
the political nature of both the collective bargaining and legislative 
processes and the constant pressure by groups to improve their job 
evaluation scores (see Ehrenberg and Smith 1987a, n. 17), there is 
reason to believe that actual comparable worth wage adjustments 
would not approach the magnitudes described above. Indeed, as we 
shall see below, several studies suggest that in practice such adjust-
ments have been much smaller in several states. 
Private-sector ex ante studies, such as those by George Johnson and 
Gary Solon (1986), Sorensen (1987b), Mark Aldrich and Robert 
Buchele (1986), and Robert S. Smith (1988), have adopted somewhat 
different approaches. Johnson and Solon use a large national sample 
of both private- and public-sector workers taken from the May 1978 
Current Population Survey and estimate wage equations for males 
and females as functions of the individuals' personal characteristics 
(e.g., age), industry dummy variables, occupational characteristics 
variables (developed by the National Research Council), and a variable 
that measures the percentage of the workers in an occupation who 
are female. In such wage equations, a larger share of female employ-
ees in an occupation is associated with lower wages. 
Johnson and Solon then interpret the concept of comparable worth 
to mean that it would be illegal to have this share influence wages 
and simulate how much the average female-male wage gap would be 
reduced if the coefficients of the female share were set at zero. De-
pending on the specification they use, an overall female-male wage 
differential of roughly 41 percent is estimated to decline by 3 to 8 
percent when this restriction is imposed. Johnson and Solon thus es-
timate that comparable worth would reduce the overall wage gap by 
at most one-tenth to one-fifth. 
Aldrich and Buchele, who used a different sample of data, the Na-
tional Longitudinal Surveys, undertook a similar calculation and 
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found that comparable worth would "reduce the male-female wage 
gap by 15 to 20 percent" (Aldrich and Buchele 1986, 148). So their 
estimate and that of Johnson and Solon are fairly consistent. 
Finally, Sorensen (1987b) extends and replicates Johnson and So-
lon's analysis, using more recent data from the May and June 1983 
Current Population Surveys, which permit her to include additional 
variables (e.g., firm size) in her estimated wage equations. Like 
Johnson and Solon, Sorensen concludes that a comparable worth pol-
icy would reduce the overall wage gap by at most one-fifth. Quite 
strikingly, however, the potential effect of such a policy is seen to vary 
widely across sectors of the economy. While she estimates that the pol-
icy might reduce the female-male earnings gap by about one-third in 
the public sector and by one-quarter in the nonmanufacturing private 
sector (defined by her to include all industries except for manufac-
turing and the public sector), it would reduce the gap in manufactur-
ing by at most only 6 percent. 
Of course, none of these authors' concepts of comparable worth re-
ally corresponds to the definition that proponents expound, namely, 
equal wages within a firm for jobs of equal value. The authors control 
for interindustry wage differentials and (in Sorensen's case) for wage 
differentials because of firm size, but these are incomplete controls 
for firm-specific wage differentials. Other studies suggest that the 
magnitude of the coefficient of the variable percentage female (that 
is, the percentage of workers in an occupation who are female) is 
sensitive to the variables that are included in the wage equation, so 
that more controls reduce the magnitude (see, for example, Filer 
1987). Moreover, as Johnson and Solon and Sorensen note, their es-
timated comparable worth effects would be diminished if coverage of 
comparable worth was incomplete. Formal job evaluations tend to be 
conducted only by large firms, and Johnson and Solon conjecture that 
only 40 percent of workers, namely those employed by the govern-
ment and by large private firms, would be affected. Assuming that 
the magnitude of the female-male wage gap does not depend on 
whether an individual employer would be covered by comparable 
worth, they further estimate that the overall effect would be to reduce 
the wage gap by only 1.4 to 3.2 percent, far less than one-tenth of the 
overall gap. 
Sorensen's (1987b) results are relevant to this point. While coverage 
of workers under comparable worth might be large in manufactur-
ing, where many workers are employed in large establishments (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1985a) her evidence cited above suggests that 
comparable worth would have a small effect in this sector. In contrast, 
in the nonmanufacturing private sector, where she estimated compa-
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rable worth to have the potential to reduce the wage gap by one-
quarter, only a small fraction of the employees would likely be cov-
ered. If coverage was restricted to workers in firms with at least one 
hundred employees, for example, only about 49 percent in the ser-
vice industry and 48 percent in retail trade would be covered (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1985b, table 5, and U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1985c, table 5). If the minimum size for coverage was set at five hun-
dred employees, these numbers would fall to about 29 percent and 38 
percent respectively. 
Of course, these crude calculations assume that females and males 
are distributed across firms of different sizes in the same manner 
and that all employees, not just those in occupations that are predom-
inantly female, would be eligible for comparable worth wage adjust-
ments. Smith (1988) made more refined calculations using the May 
1979 Current Population Survey data, which have information on in-
dividuals' industry, occupation, and size of employer, to estimate the 
maximum percentage of women who might have their wages adjusted 
as a result of a comparable worth policy. He assumes that only females 
employed in jobs that are at least 60 percent female and are either 
nonteaching jobs in the public sector (since it is hard to envision 
other jobs "comparable" to teachers in education) or private-sector 
jobs in firms that have at least five hundred employees, would be eli-
gible for such wage adjustments. Using these criteria, he concludes 
that only 23 percent of all female workers would likely be covered by a 
comparable worth policy and that they would tend to be higher-paid 
women. So, overall, the effects of comparable worth on women's 
wages might be even smaller than Johnson and Solon estimate. 
Ex Post Studies. After a well-publicized strike over the issue, San 
Jose, California, was the first city in the United States to implement 
comparable worth for its employees via the collective bargaining pro-
cess. Five wage adjustments to achieve comparable worth took place 
during the July 1981-July 1984 period. Two studies (Kahn 1987 and 
Killingsworth 1987a) provide estimates of what the effects of these 
adjustments were. Both these studies try to make inferences based on 
before and after comparisons, which require them to infer what 
would have happened in San Jose in the post-1981 period in the ab-
sence of the adjustments. As the discussion will indicate, this is not a 
simple task. 
Shulamit Kahn focuses on the wage increases for those San Jose 
city jobs that were targeted to receive comparable worth increases and 
contrasts them to the wage increases in nontargeted city jobs. She 
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finds that during the July 1980-July 1986 period the wage increases 
in targeted jobs averaged 74 percent. In contrast, the wage increases 
for other jobs in the city {not just those that had been part of an 
original pay equity survey) averaged about 50 percent during the pe-
riod. Because a similar pattern of relative wage changes was not ob-
served for jobs in other nearby local governments, she concludes that 
the observed difference in San Jose may have been due to the com-
parable worth efforts. I say "may" here because, although the other 
job wage scales in San Jose were roughly equal in 1980 to those in 
the surrounding areas, the wage scales in the jobs targeted to receive 
comparable worth increases were somewhat lower in San Jose. Hence 
some of the observed difference in wage increases may simply have 
been responses to market forces, although Kahn does note that in 
1980 wages in San Jose in the targeted public-sector occupations 
(clerical) were higher than the wages in these occupations in the pri-
vate sector. 
Mark R. Killingsworth (1987a) focuses his analysis on the 170 full-
time job classifications that were part of the original pay equity sur-
vey. He finds that between October 1981 {after the implementation of 
the first comparable worth wage adjustment) and July 1986, mean 
pay increased by 30.5 percent and 38.1 percent in the male-
dominated and female-dominated jobs respectively, which, like Kahn's 
analysis, suggests that comparable worth may have had an effect 
(smaller in his case) on wages in female-dominated occupations. 
To model more formally whether comparable worth adjustments 
affected wages in both the female-dominated and male-dominated 
occupations in the city, Killingsworth conducted both cross-section 
and longitudinal econometric analyses. As he notes, the longitudinal 
analyses, in particular his fixed and random effects models, are 
preferable. 
In both cases, Killingsworth used salary data by occupation for 
eight points in time (July 1980, October 1980, October 1981, January 
1983, August 1983, March 1984, April 1985, and July 1986); the 
first two dates preceded the implementation of comparable worth, 
while the latter six were during and after implementation. The loga-
rithm of the salary in occupation i at time t is specified to be a linear 
function of a time trend term (the number of days between July 1980 
and the date), a dummy variable that takes on the value of one once 
comparable worth is implemented (the last six dates) and zero other-
wise, and an occupation-specific effect that is assumed to be either 
fixed or random. The models are estimated separately for the male-
dominated, and female-dominated occupations, and in each case 
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the coefficient of comparable worth is interpreted as indicating by 
how much, on average, comparable worth increased wages in these 
occupations. 
Killingsworth found that, on average, comparable worth caused 
the wages of males to increase by about 9 percent more than would 
have been the case and the wages of females to rise by about 12 
percent more. As such, he concludes that comparable worth in San 
Jose increased women's wages by about 3 percent relative to those of 
men during the period; this difference was statistically significant 
from zero in the fixed effects model but not in the random effects 
model. He thus finds much smaller effects for comparable worth than 
Kahn did. 
Killingsworth's findings, however, raise two questions. First, why 
should comparable worth wage adjustments in female-dominated jobs 
cause wages to rise faster than would otherwise be the case in mate-
dominated jobs? Indeed, one fear of critics of comparable worth is 
that comparable worth wage increases would be financed by restrict-
ing wage increases in other public-sector jobs; one might thus expect 
comparable worth adjustments to reduce wage increases in male-
dominated jobs. 
This leads to the second question: why should one assume (as Kill-
ingsworth's model implicitly does) that in the absence of comparable 
worth adjustments, wages would have increased at a constant rate in 
San Jose during the July 1980—July 1986 period? In fact, average 
hourly earnings growth varied considerably for the economy as a 
whole during this period, falling from more than 9 percent in 1980 
and 1981 to less than 4 percent in 1984, 1985, and 1986. The effects 
he attributes to comparable worth may reflect only underlying nonlin-
ear trends in earnings growth in San Jose. 
Killingsworth (1987b) uses essentially the same methodological ap-
proach to estimate the effects of three sets of comparable worth wage 
adjustments that were legislatively enacted for Minnesota state em-
ployees between 1983 and 1986 (these became effective in July 1983, 
July 1984, and July 1985). He analyzes data for a random sample of 
one thousand white male and one thousand white female employees 
who were present and active in state employment during the entire 
October 1981—April 1986 period and asks whether, after holding 
constant changes in personal characteristics and allowing for long-
term pay trends, salary increases were larger for women than for 
men after the comparable worth wage adjustments. He concludes that 
the women's wages grew cumulatively by about 7 percent more and the 
men's wages by about 1.4 percent less than they would have in the 
Empirical Consequences of Comparable Worth 99 
absence of comparable worth. One must, however, again question his 
assumptions of constant trend growth rates in the absence of the 
comparable worth adjustments. 
Peter F. Orazem and J. Peter Matilla (1987) used a different 
approach to estimate the impact of a comparable worth policy on 
the wage gap of Iowa state employees. Based on a job evaluation 
study conducted by Arthur Young and Associates, a pay equity 
program was proposed in 1984 for these employees. The proposal, 
which called for wage decreases for about 40 percent of the covered 
employees, was subject to considerable political debate, and eventually 
a "compromise" program was adopted in 1985 that moderated the 
wage increases "winners" received and eliminated all the proposed 
reductions. 
Orazem and Matilla used data on a random sample of state 
employees and estimated wage equations for them using as explana-
tory variables individual characteristics, job evaluation point scores, 
and several other variables, including whether the employee was a 
woman. Three different wage outcomes were analyzed: the employ-
ee's actual wage scale as of December 1983 (prior to the comparable 
worth plan), the employee's wage scale as proposed under the Arthur 
Young plan, and the employee's wage scale after the implementation 
of the political compromise. Focusing on how the coefficient of 
the "female" variable changed with the wage outcome used enabled 
the authors to estimate the effects of the original comparable worth 
proposal and the compromise that was adopted on the male-female 
wage differential. 
The precise estimates the authors obtained are somewhat sensitive 
to the explanatory variables they included in their equations. Some of 
their specifications included private-sector market wage rates for oc-
cupations, as measured by an annual wage survey conducted by the 
state—presumably proponents of comparable worth would prefer to 
see this variable excluded. Some specifications included the job evalu-
ation point scores, while others did not. Nonetheless, all tended to 
suggest that the pay equity policy that was actually implemented re-
duced the unexplained (by the wage equations) wage gap by about 
one-quarter, whereas the gap would have been almost completely 
eliminated by the proposed policy. 
In an absolute sense, their estimates suggest that the policy that was 
implemented increased the wage scale of the average female state em-
ployee in Iowa by about 1 to 4 percentage points relative to the wage 
scale of the average male. These numbers should be contrasted to the 
average 8 percentage point gain that they estimate would have been 
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produced by the original Arthur Young pay equity proposal. Compa-
rable worth policies implemented through the political process do not 
necessarily lead to "comparable worth." Indeed, using analyses similar 
to those of Orazem and Matilla (1987), Killingsworth (1987b) reaches 
this same conclusion. 
Effect on Employment Leveb 
As with studies of the effect of comparable worth on earnings, studies 
of the effect of comparable worth on levels of employment have been 
both ex ante and ex post in nature. Among those who have con-
ducted studies in the former category are Ehrenberg and Smith 
(1987a, 1987b) and Ehrenberg, Smith, and Stratka (1986), who sim-
ulated the effect of imposing comparable worth on the employment 
levels of women in the state and local sectors, and Aldrich and 
Buchele (1986), who performed similar simulations using economy-
wide private-sector data. Included in the latter category are analyses 
by Robert G. Gregory and Ronald C. Duncan (1981) of how compa-
rable worth—type wage adjustments influenced female employment in 
Australia and by Kahn (1987) and Killingsworth (1987a, 1987b) of 
how comparable worth wage adjustments in San Jose and Minnesota, 
respectively, affected municipal and state employment levels in these 
jurisdictions. 
Comparable worth wage adjustments (CWWA) would tend to in-
crease the wages of female employees relative to those of males within 
any major occupational group (e.g., clerical) in that females are more 
likely to be employed in female-dominated detailed occupational 
groups (e.g., secretaries) that would receive CWWA increases. Simi-
larly, CWWAs would tend to increase the average wage costs in those 
major occupational groups that contain many female-dominated oc-
cupations (e.g., clerical) relative to those major occupational groups 
(e.g., blue-collar workers) that contain fewer female-dominated occu-
pations. As such, one might expect to observe decreases in the em-
ployment of women, both because of male-female employment 
substitution away from female-dominated detailed occupational 
groups within major occupational groups and because of substitution 
away from female-dominated major occupational groups. To the ex-
tent that CWWA increases for female-dominated groups are not 
"paid for" by smaller wage increases for male-dominated groups, av-
erage wages would rise, which would further depress employment lev-
els for both men and women. 
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Ex Ante Studies. Ehrenberg and Smith (1987a, 1987b) used data 
from the 1980 Census of Population grouped by state (for state em-
ployees) and SMSA (for local government employees) to simulate the 
likely effect on female employment rates of a 20 percent wage in-
crease for all female employees in these sectors. Their simulations 
are based on estimates of within-occupation male-female substitution 
elasticities obtained from a constant elasticity of substitution produc-
tion function specification and on estimates of across-occupation sub-
stitution elasticities obtained from a translog cost share specification. 
Because the estimated elasticities they obtained were quite small, they 
concluded that a 20 percent increase for all female employees in the 
sector would reduce female employment levels by only 2 to 3 percent. 
Aldrich and Buchele (1986) applied Ehrenberg and Smith's ap-
proach to private-sector data, using three-digit industries rather than 
geographic areas as units of analyses. They obtained very similar em-
ployment effects, from which they predicted that private-sector com-
parable worth wage increases in the range of 10 to 15 percent would 
reduce female employment levels by about 3 percent in that sector. 
Although the loss of female employees in each of these studies 
seems small and should allay critics' fears that comparable worth wage 
increases in the United States would lead to large losses of female 
employees, it should be emphasized that these estimates are based on 
cross-section demand elasticities that use broad occupational groups 
(four in all) and that do not control for area-specific (in the case of 
Ehrenberg and Smith) or industry-specific (in the case of Aldrich and 
Buchele) variables that might influence either male-female employ-
ment ratios within occupations or the occupational distribution of 
employment. Ehrenberg, Smith, and Stratka (1986) used longitudinal 
data on local government employment and wages from the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission's EEO-4 data to try to control 
for such omitted area-specific variables. They also used a larger num-
ber of occupational categories (eight). These modifications did not 
fundamentally alter any of the conclusions, however. 
Ex Post Studies. All the authors acknowledge that serious data prob-
lems limit the usefulness of the above studies for public policy simu-
lations and that the simulations are often based on statistically 
imprecise estimates of parameters. As such, it is useful to turn to the 
ex post studies. Gregory and Duncan's (1981) time series study of the 
Australian employment experience after the institution of comparable 
worth-type wage adjustments found that relative (by sex) employment 
demand elasticities with respect to relative (by sex) wages were suffi-
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ciently small and that the substantial relative wage increases for 
women that occurred between 1975 and 1978 in Australia reduced 
employment growth for women by only about 1.5 percentage points a 
year. The estimated slowdown in employment growth was smallest in 
the public (close to zero) and service sectors and largest in manufac-
turing. Of course, whether 1.5 percentage points per year is a small 
effect should be judged in the context of an overall female employ-
ment growth rate of 3 percentage points per year more than the male 
growth rate during the period. Viewed in this context, the Australian 
policy reduced the employment growth rate advantage of females vis-
a-vis males by one-third (1.5/[3.0 + 1.5]). As noted above, employ-
ment of males is also likely to be affected by comparable worth 
policies; Gregory and Duncan did not analyze this effect. 
In later work, Robert G. Gregory, R. Anstie, A. Daly, and V. Ho 
(1987) present analyses of the Australian data that cover the period 
from 1966 to 1984. Although they conduct no formal econometric 
analyses in their paper, they note that women increased their share of 
hours worked in Australia during the period and that the growth rate 
of this group of women was dominated by a trend in which no sharp 
slowdown occurred after the large (in the range of 20 percent) com-
parable worth—type wage adjustments were implemented. From this 
they conclude that any effects of the policy on the relative employ-
ment of women must have been very small, although they note that 
they did not analyze the effects of the policy on total employment. In 
fact, Ehrenberg and Smith (1987a, 1987b) found in their simulations 
that the potential adverse effect of a comparable worth policy on em-
ployment of women in the United States would be primarily through 
its effect on total employment. 
The two studies of the San Jose experience reach conflicting con-
clusions. Kahn (1987) finds that municipal employment grew more 
rapidly during the 1981-86 period in the public sector of San Jose 
than in other neighboring cities, that employment in the municipal 
jobs targeted for CWWA in San Jose grew more rapidly than munic-
ipal employment in nontargeted jobs, and that the percentage of fe-
male workers in these targeted jobs actually increased. From this 
evidence Kahn concludes that comparable worth had no adverse ef-
fects on employment, that higher wages in the targeted jobs induced 
more females to apply, and that affirmative action, or an increase in 
the labor supply of women in general, led to the increases in the em-
ployment of women. 
It is hard to evaluate the validity of Kahn's findings because they 
are all based on simple comparisons of trend increases in employ-
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ment across occupations in San Jose and/or across local governments 
in the San Jose area. Put another way, implicitly, she is assuming that, 
in the absence of comparable worth, municipal employment would 
have grown at the same rate for all occupations in San Jose and that 
this rate would have equaled the growth rate of municipal employ-
ment in neighboring cities. As such, she does not allow for the pos-
sibility that conditions other than comparable worth influence employ-
ment growth and labor supply across occupations and areas. 
Killingsworth (1987a) estimates a fixed effects model using data 
for six points in time and the 170 full-time job classifications that 
were part of the original San Jose job evaluation study. The loga-
rithm of employment in an occupation at each time is specified to be 
a function only of the logarithm of the occupational wage at that 
time, a time trend term to control for general growth in employment, 
and occupation-specific dummy variables. Separate equations are esti-
mated for male- and female-dominated jobs, and he concludes that 
negative wage elasticities of demand, in the range of minus one, exist 
for both the male- and female-dominated occupations. Killingsworth 
attributes the increases in employment that Kahn observes to his time 
trend term (which is about 9 percent per year for both male- and 
female-dominated jobs). Given his estimate that the CWWA increased 
males' wages by about 9 percent and females' wages by about 12 per-
cent, Killingsworth concludes that these wage adjustments actually 
"cost" San Jose's male municipal employees one year's employment 
growth and female municipal employees more than one year's 
growth. 
Killingsworth (1987b) performs similar analyses for Minnesota us-
ing data for 876 male-dominated state jobs and 203 female-
dominated state jobs over nineteen quarters during the October 
1981-April 1986 period. He finds wage elasticities in the range of 
minus one for both males and females when starting wage scale data 
are used. Coupled with his estimated wage effects reported earlier, 
these data suggest that the comparable worth wage adjustments in 
Minnesota decreased female employment levels by about 7 percent and 
increased male employment levels by about 1.4 percent during the 
1981-86 period. The estimated effect on women is equivalent to a 
loss of about one year's employment growth. 
Of course, Killingsworth's results for both San Jose and Minnesota 
are contingent first on his estimated CWWA effects on the wages of 
males and females in these jurisdictions; as noted above, I believe 
there are problems with these estimates. Second, his employment 
equations do not permit interoccupational substitution (an occupa-
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tion's wage influences its employment level only) and assume that omit-
ted time-specific factors influence all occupations in a gender group 
identically and at a constant rate over time. Indeed, no thought is 
given to the possibility that comparable worth per se may have influ-
enced the trend rate of growth of employment (one of Kahn's points) 
independent of its effects via wage rates. Although my own prefer-
ence is for rigorous econometric modeling, such as Killingsworth's, 
the jury is still out on the effects of comparable worth on municipal 
employees in San Jose and on state employees in Minnesota. 
General Equilibrium Considerations: 
Who Will Win and Who Will Lose 
The studies discussed in the previous section ignore the partial cov-
erage aspect of any comparable worth policy that is likely to be imple-
mented in the United States. If comparable worth has adverse effects 
on employment rates in the covered sector, displaced workers may 
seek jobs in the uncovered sector, resulting in downward pressure on 
wages there. Even if the number of jobs lost by female employees in 
the covered sector is low relative to the wage gains induced by com-
parable worth there, it is not obvious that women as a group would 
gain. Women in the low-paid uncovered sector might find, for exam-
ple, that their wages are lowered even more by the "crowding" of dis-
placed workers into that sector (see Smith 1988). 
Alternatively, increased wages in the covered sector might induce 
some displaced women to remain "attached" to the covered sector 
in the hope of obtaining a higher-paying job in the future. Thus 
the policy might lead to "wait unemployment" among females. As is 
well known, in this case the increase in the number of females who 
are unemployed might exceed the number displaced because of the 
increase in covered-sector wages caused by the CWWA policy, and 
the direction that female wages in the uncovered sector would move 
would depend on demand elasticities in both sectors (see Ehrenberg 
and Smith 1988, chap. 12, for a more extended discussion of wait 
unemployment). 
Of course, in addition to influencing the allocation of women em-
ployees between the covered and uncovered sectors, CWWA may also 
influence the labor force participation rates and occupational choice 
of women. Higher wages in some female-dominated occupations 
might induce more women to enter the labor force and increase the 
supply of women to occupations in which the adjustments took place 
(Kahn 1987). Higher wages in these occupations might increase their 
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attractiveness to incumbents and new entrants and thus reduce the 
mobility of women into traditionally male-dominated occupations. Fi-
nally, higher wages in traditionally female-dominated occupations 
might increase the supply of males to these occupations, thereby re-
ducing occupational segregation. 
Empirical research related to these topics has been surprisingly 
slim. As noted above, Kahn (1987) found that CWWAs were associ-
ated with an increased representation by women in targeted occupa-
tions in San Jose. Perry C. Beider, B. Douglas Bernheim, Victor R. 
Fuchs, and John B. Shoven (1988) simulate in a computable general 
equilibrium model some of the effects of a policy (like comparable 
worth) that raises the wages of females. Although their simulations 
likely overstate the effects of comparable worth, because the policies 
they simulate eliminate all gender differences in earnings within ma-
jor occupational groups, they are the only authors who analyze com-
parable worth empirically in a general equilibrium framework. 
Beider et al. find that comparable worth would induce more mar-
ried women to enter the labor force and that increased employment 
for these women would be at the expense of employment for males 
and single women. Despite the loss of employment to these groups, 
they would gain in a distributional sense because of their increased 
wages. In contrast, married couples would lose (increased employ-
ment of married women would be offset by decreased employment 
for some of their husbands), and single men as a group would be the 
big losers. Beider et al. also present estimates of efficiency and em-
ployment losses under a variety of assumptions about, for example, 
coverage of comparable worth (partial or total), the nature of utility 
functions for married couples, the elasticities of supply and substitu-
tion, and employer hiring rules (applicant fraction or historical frac-
tion), and are careful to stress the sensitivity of their results to 
changes in assumptions. Nonetheless, to keep their model "com-
putable," they are forced to limit it to only two occupational groups 
(skilled and unskilled). This restriction prevents them from address-
ing a number of the issues described above. 
Conclusions 
As this survey has shown, we know very little about what the true 
"general equilibrium" effects of comparable worth are likely to be. 
The research described above has concentrated heavily on estimating 
what the direct effects of comparable worth might be on the female-
male wage gap and what the likely direct effects of comparable worth 
106 Ehrenberg 
wage changes might be on the employment of women in the covered 
sector. Although the authors of the various studies might disagree, 
the evidence appears to be fairly consistent. The studies surveyed 
above suggest that one of the direct effects of comparable worth 
will be to reduce modestly the overall female-male wage gap and that 
this reduction would be achieved at the cost of only small losses of 
female employees. 
What is missing, however, is much discussion of the true general 
equilibrium, or second-round effects, that comparable worth would be 
likely to induce. Would the altered wage structure affect the occupa-
tional choices of males and females in the covered sector and/or em-
ployers' hiring decisions? Would the changing wage structure in one 
sector of the economy lead to alterations in the wage structure in the 
rest of the economy? Would higher mandated wages in female-
dominated jobs lead to higher implicit hiring standards, or would em-
ployers compensate by providing less on-the-job training? Would 
these higher wages reduce occupational mobility for women over 
the life cycle and their earnings growth rates? (See Hashimoto 1982 
for evidence that minimum wages affect earnings growth rates.) 
Analyses of issues such as these should be on the agenda of compa-
rable worth researchers. 
